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March 2008
Deficient Development Agreements
Roger Bernhardt
In Neighbors in Support of Appropriate Land Use v County of Tuolumne (2007) 157 CA4th
997, 68 CR3d 882, reported on p 58, the Fifth District Court of Appeal threw out a development
agreement (and the associated conditional use permit) between Tuolumne County and the
Petersons because, the court held, it was inconsistent with the county’s zoning ordinance. The
development agreement purported to permit the Petersons to host lawn parties and weddings on
their 37-acre property.
Lawn party hosting was neither a permitted nor a conditionally allowed use under the 37-acre
minimum lot size agricultural zoning classification the county had previously applied to the
property. That made the conditional use permit (CUP) almost ipso facto invalid; a permit cannot
be issued to cover what has never been declared an appropriate conditional use in the authorizing
ordinance.
More important, issuance of the CUP could not be justified under the ordinance on which the
development agreement was based, because that ordinance violated Govt C §65852, the
uniformity requirement of the Planning and Zoning Law (Govt C §§65000–66499.58), which
states that “all [zoning] regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of building throughout
each zone.”
The philosophic aspects of the controversy must have been deemed important, since the actual
fight was more of the tempest-in-a-teapot variety. As far as the facts on the ground were
concerned, this 37-acre parcel was bordered by two similarly zoned parcels to its west, but was
flanked by 2- to 5-acre parcels on the north, south, and east (where I surmise that the challenged
activity might have been allowed). Consequently, it might have required only the redrawing of a
line on the zoning map to place the parcel into a different and more lenient classification. The
county supervisors were considering a text amendment to the zoning ordinance that would have
reclassified lawn parties as conditional uses in its 37-acre agricultural zones, which would have
accomplished the same result. No one appeared to contend that either of those acts would have
been invalid. In other words, the same result could have been reached, just by a different route,
and the politics would probably have been the same, since the same procedural features (public
notice, hearing, and vote) would have remained applicable—e.g., same public supporters and
opponents, same supervisors. So why did it matter so much that the county attempted to achieve
this result by development agreement rather than by zoning amendment?
Some background on two troublesome characteristics of land use regulations—uniformity and
revisions—may help.
Uniformity Within a Zone
On their face, zoning laws would seem to violate the principle of equal protection: X is
permitted to build a factory on his land because it is zoned industrial, whereas Y, a block away,
can erect only a house on hers, because it is zoned residential instead. Endorsers of zoning dodge

this problem by claiming that there is the necessary uniformity inside each zone, even if it is
lacking outside each zone. Without that proposition, all zoning would fail.
But uniformity does not always make for good planning; it too easily leads to a ticky-tacky,
monotonous neighborhood where no one wants to live, or even visit. As a consequence,
combined with our two-value zoning rules—where every use should be either permitted or
prohibited—are escape routes. Land use regulation includes mechanisms designed to reduce
rigidity: amending zoning ordinances and maps, conditional uses, and (although not exactly
intended to have that effect) variances.
While those devices have been part of the system since its start, more came along later: design
review, planned unit developments, floating zones, and historic preservation. The departure from
as-of-right zoning has become even more dramatic as the zoning process has become more like
that of subdivision regulation, where predetermined rules that had set forth known predictable
standards have been replaced by after-the-fact reaction and negotiation from local officials to
development proposals that are initiated by developers rather than by planners. We may still pay
lip service to the earlier notion of uniformity, but there is no longer much realism behind the idea
that all properties are being treated equally now that each proposal is judged separately and
independently. Flexibility has won out over equality.
Changing the Rules in Midstream
Among the many risks that land development entails is the danger that the legal climate that
existed while the development was being planned will change for the worse before the project
has been completed and taken off the developer’s books. If you have already purchased and paid
for the land (and perhaps also for, e.g., the building plans), where will you be if the town alters
its local height, space, or use limits before your construction has started?
The doctrine of vested rights is designed to protect the finished product from most changes
that could materially hurt it thereafter; it is unlikely that a new height limit can have much effect
on a completed and tenanted building (although, even then, there is the power to prohibit
alteration of nonconforming structures, and the possible right to “amortize” them away over
time). But at the front end of the calendar, a vested right generally does not come into being until
after there has been substantial reliance upon the right building permit, which is an event that
may not occur until after many millions of dollars have been spend on “preliminary” costs. See,
e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v South Coast Reg’l Comm’n (1976) 17 C3d 785, 132 CR
386, where $2.8 million had been spent before the rules changed.
Since any real estate development inevitably needs significant time from start to completion, a
developer has to feel pretty certain that those horribles are unlikely to occur, and the local
officials who want to increase their tax revenues through development need to make sufficient
assurances to encourage the necessary risk-taking. How can a community cross its heart in that
way?
The traditional legal answer was that it cannot be done. Binding assurances can’t be given
because the police power cannot be bargained away. A local government cannot hamstring itself
from passing new laws when new contingencies arise, or prevent its citizens from voting the
rascals out of office in order to undo their machinations. But that rule, like the old-fashioned
uniformity doctrine, is too detrimental to growth. Developers just cannot afford to take soughtfor risks unless there is a way to fetter the police power to ensure that the rules don’t change.

Thus, in California (and some other jurisdictions), we now have the statutory Development
Agreement Law (Govt C §§65864–65869.5) to provide a different solution to that problem.
Government Code §65865.4 creates a way to give assurance to the developer that it may carry
out its project in accordance with the rules operative at that time, “notwithstanding any change in
any applicable general or specific plan, zoning, subdivision, or building regulation adopted”
thereafter. The need to give assurances has prevailed over the sanctity of the police power and
the inability to bargain it away.
Development Agreements and Flexibility
Since the purpose of the development agreement statutes is to give such agreements the
unambiguous protection that developers need to eliminate the uncertainties inherent in the vested
rights and sanctity of police powers doctrines (and the gap between them), it would not seem to
require that the process also must include a way for allowing additional nonuniform flexibility
into the real estate projects created under them. The developer makes sure, independently, that
all of the other conditions of the governmental land use regulatory scheme are satisfied, and then
seeks the development agreement to guarantee that this current compliance will not be rendered
obsolete by a later rule or rule change.
The agreement reached in Tuolumne County, however, does not seem to have been intended
to deal with any problem of developer risk; it is unlikely that lawn party hosting entails much
start-up capital investment. Rather, it was contrived to overcome the fact that commercial lawn
party hosting was not a permitted use for that property under the existing zoning ordinance. That
puts it under the flexibility issues that I earlier discussed, rather than the stability issues. The
county had in fact toyed with the idea of amending its zoning ordinance to make lawn parties
conditional uses in the 37-acre agricultural zones, which would have had exactly the same effect.
(The opinion said that a CUP would have been different because it would have allowed all other
owners to make similar requests, although that danger could have easily been avoided by making
one of the conditions for this activity a finding that no similar use was too close by.)
But does the fact that a development agreement looks like an inappropriate method to deal
with an “inflexible” zoning ordinance make it also an illegal method? Under Govt C §65866, all
other land use rules continue to apply in the case of a development agreement “unless otherwise
provided,” which might make one think that the agreement could thus otherwise provide as to a
zoning rule. Government Code §65867.5 mandates that a development agreement can be
approved only if it complies with the “general plan and any specific plan,” which also does not
appear to require compliance with zoning ordinances. Given those provisions, is the legislature
really prohibiting a development agreement that carries its own zoning regime with it?
The Development Agreement Manual published by the Institute for Local Government, the
research arm of the League of California Cities, takes it for granted that a development
agreement may constitute its own charter and may “contain provisions that vary from otherwise
applicable zoning standards.” Inst. for Local Gov’t, Development Agreement Manual:
Collaboration in Pursuit of Community Interest 9 (2002). Indeed, that publication goes on to
advise that
attorneys need to decide what language to use in the event the parties agree to allow land uses
that are inconsistent with the otherwise applicable zoning requirements in existence at the time
the development agreement was negotiated. One approach is to include language saying that the

then-existing zoning ordinance governs, but only to the extent it is not inconsistent with any
provision of the agreement....
... But Not Here
Given these authorities, it is no wonder that Tuolumne County planning staff, and perhaps
even county counsel, thought the development agreement was a lawful alternative at the time the
deal was drafted.
But none of that persuaded the court in this case. A development agreement could not be its
own source of zoning regulations. In order to get around all of the contrary authorities just
mentioned, the court had to dance around the statutes and dismiss the Development Agreement
Manual on the ground that it contained no legal arguments, even though it was drafted by
lawyers.
The chief reason given by the court for refusing to treat a development agreement as an
independent source of land use authority (despite a special enabling statute) was the uniformity
requirement I earlier discussed: Allowing a parcel to be regulated by a development agreement
rather than a zoning ordinance would give its owners a benefit not shared by the owners of other
properties similarly zoned. The fact that this already occurs whenever neighboring owners are
differently zoned, or a single parcel is rezoned, or a conditional use permit (or variance) is
granted to one but not another, was not enough to persuade it to abandon that principle. The fact
that such outcomes are also upheld in contract zoning and conditional zoning situations fared no
better—those cases were cited by the court, but distinguished away. The rules must be uniform
within a district, despite all of these examples to the contrary. Flexibility can go only so far in
vanquishing equality.
Can We Live With This?
For the parties involved in this case, the outcome seems hardly devastating; it should take but
a small restructuring of techniques to reach the outcome that the owners and some county
officials want. (Although some neighbors clearly disliked the idea, they apparently lacked the
clout to stop it at the political level.)
For everybody else, i.e., the rest of us, the holding merely instructs that to get what the client
wants, one still must play the game by the oldest of all the old rules—the zoning has to match the
activity. Get all of the entitlements the same as always, and use a development agreement to
make them stick, not to make them different.

